FOREWORD

GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER*
Debate over the utility of economic sanctions remains brisk and
their use has certainly not diminished. In our recent book, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered 3d edition, my colleagues and I examined
204 episodes over the past century and concluded that, in about
one-third of the episodes, economic sanctions succeeded to some
degree in achieving their foreign policy goals.1 The one-third rate
may not seem terrific, but it does contradict the common statement
that “sanctions never work.” We found that the success of
economic sanctions depends on various factors—including the
type of goal sought, the economic and political context in the target
country, and the manner in which the sanctions were
implemented. For practitioners, the important question is how to
design sanctions so they work better.
Since the end of the Cold War, sanctions policies have shifted
dramatically. The decline of super power rivalry coupled with the
force of globalization changed the objectives and geographic locus
of sanctions and introduced new players into the game: non-state
actors (both benign non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
and malign terrorists and drug traffickers) along with different
layers of government (notably Congress, and many states and
cities). Sanctions policies have consequently targeted a wider
spectrum of issues such as ethnic strife, civil chaos, human rights,
democracy, narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Authors in this
symposium issue delve into the new aspects and deliver a wealth
of thoughtful analysis.
* Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics. My research assistant Jisun Kim helped prepare this introduction.
1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED158 (3d
ed. 2007).
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Reflecting its role as economic, political and military super
power, the United States has long been the predominant sender
country. The incidence of U.S. unilateral actions has fallen
dramatically since the Second World War, but economic sanctions
remain an important tool of U.S. foreign policy. To carry out its
designs in recent decades, the United States often seeks
cooperation from other countries.
Since the 1990s, non-state actors, such as Osama bin Laden’s al
Qaeda network, have increasingly launched attacks against the
United States and its allies. The 9/11 attack in 2001 shocked the
United States and much of international society, and triggered the
“war on terrorism.” Iran rose high on the list of the intelligence
community and was seen as a danger to the United States and its
allies. The Iranian government has funded non-state terrorists,
notably Hamas and Hezbollah, and has continued to pursue
nuclear weapons. Since 1983, when Iran was implicated in the
terrorist bombing in Lebanon, the United States has incrementally
raised its barriers on trade and investment with Iran, especially
targeting the Iranian oil industry, the country’s main source of
revenue. In 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act (“ILSA”) which supplemented existing measures with
additional restrictions on foreign companies that undertake new
oilfield investments in Iran. When terminated with respect to
Libya, the act was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act, and extended
until December 31, 2011.2 However, sanctions have not successfully
blunted Iranian determination to develop nuclear weapons and
fund terrorists.
In his Article A New Sanction for a New Century: Treasury’s
Innovative Use of Banking Sanctions, Orde F. Kittrie, law professor at
Arizona State University, examines the utility of the banking
sanctions on Iran. These sanctions are enforced by the Treasury
Department. Using banking restrictions, the United States has
tried to interrupt Iran’s access to normal financial channels in ways
that might support nuclear and terrorist activities. The U.S.
government has persuaded some foreign governments as well as
individual foreign firms to cooperate with these efforts. The active
engagement of the Treasury Department has improved intelligence
about global financial transactions. As a result, financial sanctions
2 KENNETH KATZMAN, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
at 3, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports
/RS20871.pdf.
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are better able to target specific individuals, firms or governmental
agencies that might be engaged in misdeeds. Kittrie recommends
that more nations should grant their finance ministries the
authority to use intelligence with similar goals in mind. There is
much to be said for this recommendation: among the 204 sanctions
episodes documented in our study, my colleagues and I found that
sixty-two episodes entailed a combination of financial and trade
sanctions, and that this combination has higher success rates on
average than trade sanctions only—40 percent of the time versus 25
percent.3
Under the Obama administration, the Treasury Department
seems likely to maintain this approach. In his written responses,
dated January 21, 2009, to members of the Senate Finance
Committee, Treasury Secretary-designate Timothy Geithner stated
that:
Vigorous sanctions are an essential means for forcing
nations that foster terror financing and weapons
proliferation to choose between defiance and responsible
engagement with the world. . . . I would consider the full
range of tools available to the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, including unilateral measures, to prevent Iran
from misusing the financial system to engage in
proliferation and terrorism.4
Another noticeable development in U.S. sanctions policies is
more extensive use of secondary sanctions. Since the 1990s, the
United States, at both the federal and state level, has threatened or
invoked secondary boycotts against parties that abetted the target
country. For example, the Helms-Burton Act targeting Cuba, and
ILSA targeting Iran and Libya, both included provisions to impose
sanctions against foreign companies doing business with the target
countries. These acts sparked a serious backlash in the European
Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada, all of which have
commercial interests in the target countries. Some of the objecting
countries enacted their own laws to counteract the effect of US
HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 170.
Finance Committee Questions for the Record: Hearing on Confirmation of Mr.
Timothy F. Geithner to be Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury Before the S.
Comm. On Finance, 111th Cong. 50, 67 (2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner),
avialable at http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/012209
%20TFG%20Questions.pdf
3
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measures, and they threatened to bring a case in the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”). But Presidents Clinton and Bush both used
their waiver authority to avert an eruption of trade disputes.
Today, a recurring question is whether to sanction China because it
carries on oil investments in Sudan.
In his Article, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, Jeffrey A.
Meyer, associate law professor of Quinnipiac University, explores
the legality of secondary sanctions under customary international
law. He contends that secondary sanctions can not be categorically
dismissed as improperly “extraterritorial” since they are no more
impermissible or extraterritorial than conventional primary
sanctions. He argues that conventional primary sanctions also seek
to change extraterritorial behavior, even when they are applied
only against U.S. companies doing business in the target country.
Therefore, if secondary sanctions are well-tailored and grounded
on “terrinational” principles—the combination of territorial and
nationality jurisdiction—meaning that measures regulate only the
conduct of the sender country’s nationals within its own
territory—they should be, in Meyer’s view, regarded as legally
permissible.
Secondary sanctions imposed by state and city governments
have raised concerns not only about international legal issues but
also about the possible infringement of federal authority. The
National Foreign Trade Council (“NFTC”) brought a case against
the state of Massachusetts regarding “the Massachusetts Burma
law,” adopted in 1996, which prohibited the state from purchasing
goods and services from corporations doing business with Burma.5
While the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law preempted
“the Massachusetts Burma law,” the Court’s decision was not
grounded on constitutional interpretation, but only on the fact that
Congress had passed a corresponding (and therefore preemptive)
law sanctioning Burma.6
In his Article, Darfur, Divestment and Dialogue, Perry S. Bechky,
visiting assistant professor at the University of Connecticut law
school, focuses on state-mandated divestment—one form of
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
Id. at 388. The Massachusetts law was also challenged in the WTO by the
European Union and Japan in 1997, arguing that the law violated the WTO’s
government procurement agreement. However, the European Union and Japan
suspended the WTO case when the federal lawsuit was filed against
Massachusetts by the NFTC.
5
6
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secondary sanctions—imposed on Sudan for atrocities in Darfur.
He addresses constitutional concerns regarding participation of
sub-federal governments in the formation of US foreign policy. In
2003, a rebellion started in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur;
in response, the Sudanese government mounted horrible attacks
against civilians in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur presented a moral
challenge to the world.7 Citing Darfur in 2006, the United States
expanded its sanctions already in place against Sudan. To date,
twenty-seven U.S. states, the District of Columbia and twenty cities
have all participated in divestment aimed at companies doing
business in Sudan. Despite constitutional concerns, the US
Congress authorized states to enact these measures when it
adopted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (“SADA”)
in 2007. Bechky argues that the divestment movements taken by
states and cities should be understood as an effort to send a strong
message to the federal government and to boost political support
for wider action, rather than as a constitutional disturbance to the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
In his Article, Using Sociological Theories of Isomorphism to
Evaluate the Possibility of Regime Change Through Trade Sanction,
unlike studies that examine trade sanctions in the context of
economic theory, Philip M. Nichols, associate professor at the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, takes a new
approach. He examines trade sanctions in the sociological view of
three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change8—namely
normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive
isomorphism. Normative isomorphism stems from professional
pressures which spring from similar training and networks.
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when one institution mimics another.
Coercive isomorphism describes convergence in institutions as a
response to incentives which can be either positive or negative.
Nichols seeks to explain the relation between trade sanctions
and changes in institutions within the context of these three
mechanisms. He takes Cuba as an example and examines why
7 While the United Nations has been reluctant to define these atrocities as
“genocide” under the Genocide Convention, the United States and some other
countries have labeled the crisis as “genocide.” Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (III), 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948), available at http://www.preventgenocide.org
/law/convention/text.htm.
8 Isomorphism refers to similar behavior by organizations facing similar
conditions.
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Cuban institutions became similar to institutions of socialists
countries, notably the Soviet Union. Trade sanctions imposed on
Cuba sharply curtailed its interaction with democratic countries.
Cuba was thus excluded from participating in the Organization of
American States and instead joined the Soviet Union’s Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance. This increased the migration of
Soviet and Eastern European technical advisors and economic
planners to Cuba, and led Cuban institutions to become more
similar to those in the Soviet Union (normative isomorphism).
Isolation also gave Cuba more opportunity to copy the institutions
of those Soviet countries (mimetic isomorphism). Nichols also
argues that trade sanctions enhanced the incentives offered from
socialist countries (coercive isomorphism).
Nichols concludes that this sociological approach suggests that
trade sanctions may not produce the expected outcome but even
go the wrong direction. My colleagues and I share this conclusion.
Our reasons for failure include the proposition that sanctions
create their own antidotes both by sparking a nationalist reaction
and by prompting powerful allies of the target country to assume
the role of “black knights”—both evident features in the Cuban
case.9
Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts in Africa have raised
grave concerns about the collapse of democracy and human rights.
The European Union and the United Nations have taken serious
actions against strife, mass killings, and despotic leadership in
Africa. Reflecting these concerns, both democratization and
human rights have become a popular goal in recent episodes.
However, in our study, my colleagues and I found that sanctions
are often less effective when aimed against autocratic nations than
democratic countries.10 Autocratic regimes are better able to shift
the burden of external economic pressure on to the least influential
groups in society.
In their Article, Economic Sanctions, Leadership Survival, and
Human Rights, Christiane Carneiro and Dominique Elden explored
the impact of economic sanctions on human rights. They seek to
answer how leadership change resulting from economic sanctions
might affect human rights. To answer this question, Carneiro and
Elden examine four countries: Turkey; Fiji; Pakistan; and Sierra

9
10

HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
Id. at 166–68.
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Leone, all subjects of economic sanctions. Carneiro and Elden
argue that economic development and democratization may have
adverse impacts on human rights since they are often associated
with strong leadership which in turn can be accompanied by
political repression. Therefore, when economic sanctions aimed at
promoting democracy are imposed—in particular, when sanctions
target autocracies—the resulting political pressures may adversely
affect the level of human rights protection. This is an intriguing
proposition and, as the authors note, deserves further inquiry.
This is a fine symposium. Scholars and practitioners alike will
find much value in these Articles.
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